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1. Introduction 
The development of bond markets in Asia has recently emerged as an important policy 
issue. During the Ninth APEC Finance Ministers Meeting in September 2002, it was agreed 
that a regional bond market would be developed through securitisation and credit 
guarantees. Since then, a number of meetings have been held on this and related issues. 
The consensus for developing regional bond markets for Asian countries is a result of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, which the underdevelopment of the region’s bond markets is 
thought to have greatly exacerbated. Firms that had long been dependent upon banks for 
funds could not find alternative sources of financing when the crisis erupted. The idea of 
creating regional bond markets is also promoted as a means of overcoming the double 
mismatch problem that most Asian borrowers face when depending on short-term foreign 
currency debt to fund long-term projects generating domestic currency revenues. This is also 
considered one of the root causes of the 1997 crisis. 
Development of a regional bond market is also seen as a way to facilitate the mobilisation of 
East Asian savings within the region. The foreign exchange reserves of most Asian countries 
have increased significantly since the financial crisis, boosted by the huge current account 
surpluses triggered by the economic recession and sharp currency depreciations brought 
about by the financial crisis. By the end of 2002, the Asian economies together held more 
than half of the world’s foreign exchange reserves, and the bulk of these were invested in 
safe and liquid assets such as US Treasury securities and supranational bonds. At the same 
time, until regional bond markets are fully established, East Asian borrowers have to rely on 
international financial markets for funding. East Asia as a whole can thus be considered an 
importer of safe assets and an exporter of risky assets. As has been pointed out by Oh et al 
(2003a), such a pattern of capital flows is not desirable in the sense that it deprives the 
region’s financial markets and institutions of valuable opportunities to develop and could 
render the countries in the region more vulnerable to financial crises. 
Under the Asian Bond Market Initiative, ASEAN+3 has launched six working groups to study 
various aspects of regional bond markets including securitisation, regional credit rating 
agencies, regional clearing and settlement systems, regional credit guarantee agencies and 
so on.
2 The paper focuses on the two topics that primarily address building institutional 
infrastructure for the Asian bond market: securities clearing and settlement systems and 
credit rating agencies. 
Every financial transaction ultimately entails settlement of securities. In order for financial 
markets to function properly, reliable and efficient financial substructures, including clearing 
and settlement systems, must be established and supported by the legal and regulatory 
                                                  
1  We thank Haeil Jang at the Korea Securities Depository (KSD) for helpful comments and discussions. 
2  EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks) has also set up the Asian Bond Fund 
(ABF) with contributions from the foreign reserves of each member bank. This fund is managed by the Bank 
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systems. An internationally compatible clearing and settlement system is required to promote 
active cross-border transactions of bonds among Asian countries. Section 2 of this paper 
discusses how a cross-border clearing and settlement system can be constructed for the 
development of Asian bond markets. The paper attempts to determine if it is necessary to 
establish a new Asian settlement system even though there are cross-border settlement 
systems operated by international central securities depositories (ICSDs) such as Euroclear 
and Clearstream. 
The second financial infrastructure component that this paper addresses is the regional 
credit rating system. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 made East Asian countries recognise 
the importance of international credit rating agencies. These countries witnessed the 
influence of the judgments of credit rating agencies in shaking domestic economies and 
foreign markets to their foundations and in determining the direction and intensity of foreign 
capital flows. Credit rating agencies are expected to become more influential because capital 
adequacy for banks under the revised Basel Accord will take credit ratings into account (BIS 
(1999)). 
Currently, local currency denominated bonds in Asian countries are independently rated by 
local credit rating agencies. Government bonds are given the highest credit ratings within 
each country regardless of the sovereign credit ratings, making credit rating comparisons 
among countries useless. To increase transaction volumes in Asian bond markets and cross-
border bond issuance and investment, a common regional credit rating system is needed. 
Let us consider, for example, the two-tier securitisation process, which is already under 
discussion as a strategy for creating the Asian bond market. In this process, each country 
aggregates and securitises local currency denominated bonds; the junior bonds are 
absorbed domestically, and the senior bonds are sold to the offshore special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). The SPV, in turn, repackages these senior bonds and issues asset-backed securities 
(ABSs).
3 For this two-tier securitisation process to work, the credit ratings of the bonds 
issued in the first and second stages must be based on a common standard, regardless of 
the country of issuance.
4 
Section 3 of this paper takes up the question of whether there is a need to establish a new 
regional credit rating institution in Asia. The alternative would be for the local or global credit 
rating agencies to continue to do the job. 
This paper makes different recommendations regarding the settlement and clearing system 
and credit rating. We recommend that a new regional institution (a regional ICSD dubbed 
AsiaSettle) be created to serve as the regional clearing and settlement system. For the credit 
rating system, in contrast, we recommend that a common standard and methodology be 
established through coordination among the existing local credit rating agencies. 
Establishment of a regional ICSD is recommended even though ICSDs such as Euroclear 
and Clearstream already handle cross-border settlements. Establishment of AsiaSettle would 
solve the third time zone problem, which the existing ICSDs cannot solve, and the process of 
establishing AsiaSettle with the support of the Asian governments itself would provide an 
opportunity for Asian countries to relax and harmonise financial regulations and open up their 
domestic markets. 
                                                  
3  For a discussion on the pros and cons of two-tier securitisation, please refer to Oh and Park (2003). 
4  The need for a common rating standard will become a more concrete problem when the New Basel Accord is 
adopted. This is because when capital adequacy regulations consider credit ratings, the financial supervisory 
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Conversely, it is unrealistic and not recommendable to establish a regional credit rating 
agency through government support. In the credit rating business, advanced scientific and 
analytic methods are important, but so are value judgments based on local knowledge. Thus, 
if the regional rating agency is to rate local bonds in each country, it must build up local 
databases, human resources and other infrastructure. The costs of building this infrastructure 
would not be negligible. In addition, for a credit rating business to be successful, the most 
important factor is its reputation for being impartial and accurate. It is questionable whether 
an agency established with government support and not exposed to market competition 
would be competitive and acknowledged by the market as impartial. Also, if a regional 
agency were established with government support, there would be the risk that the agency 
would crowd out private local credit rating agencies. Therefore, it is preferable for the 
governments to promote collaboration among local and global rating agencies in establishing 
a common rating system and meeting new business needs. The Association of Credit Rating 
Agencies in Asia (ACRAA) has already started to standardise the rating systems with a view 
to developing the Asian bond market. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the current cross-border clearing and 
settlement system in Asia and the role of the existing ICSDs. It evaluates the pros and cons 
of various possibilities for setting up a cross-border clearing and settlement system in Asia 
and proposes the establishment of AsiaSettle as a regional ICSD. A detailed explanation of 
the benefits of creating a new regional ICSD is offered. 
Section 3 discusses the credit rating system. Like Section 2, it deals with the current status of 
credit rating agencies in Asia and the role of the global credit rating agencies. Section 3 goes 
on to take up the question of whether establishment of a new agency or collaboration among 
the existing local agencies would be more appropriate. This section also discusses how the 
collaboration should be arranged if this second option is considered more appropriate. 
2.  Building a settlement infrastructure for Asian bond markets 
2.1  Cross-border securities settlement in Asia 
Cross-border trades of securities can be settled through four different channels: (i) through a 
local agent, (ii) through a global custodian (GC), (iii) through an ICSD or (iv) through a 
national central securities depository (NCSD) that has a link with the NCSD in the country of 
issue.
5 All of these channels are utilised in varying degrees for cross-border settlement in 
Asia.
6 
Historically, local agents have been used most frequently in cross-border settlement, 
especially when securities settlement must be made in a country that has no linkage 
between its NCSD and other NCSDs or between its NCSD and ICSD. However, using a local 
custodian has one major disadvantage in that investors must designate a separate local 
custodian for each country where investments are made, and sometimes the fees charged 
by local custodians can be significant. 
Due to this cost disadvantage, institutional investors have increasingly used global 
custodians (GCs) that provide settlement and custody services in multiple markets through a 
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single gateway by integrating services performed by a network of subcustodians, including its 
own local branches. GCs can offer cost advantages through economies of scale and scope. 
Another important advantage of using GCs is the availability of integrated multicurrency 
banking and cash management services since most GCs are large international commercial 
banks. Most settlements of Asian securities are made through GCs, not ICSDs, using 
international currencies such as the US dollar. 
In fact, the business base of GCs lies in the inefficiency of the international financial market 
due to differences in the trading, clearing and settlement systems of each country. GCs 
provide investors with the convenience of a single interface for their international security 
transactions. The convenience of a single gateway, however, must come at a price since 
GCs also have to hire local agents themselves. In addition, the quality of their services differs 
widely by region depending upon the quality of service provided by the local agents. 
 
Table 1 
Countries with settlement linkages to Euroclear
1 
Region Countries Number 
Asia Pacific  Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
9 
Europe  Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Austria, Italy 
16 
America  United States, Argentina, Canada, Mexico  4 
Others  Russia, South Africa  2 
Total   31 
1  Includes all countries linked to Euroclear through specialised depositories, common depositories or clearing 
depositories. 
Source: Korea Securities Depository. 
 
Another way to conduct cross-border settlement is to use an ICSD. As a matter of fact, 
ICSDs are the natural channels of cross-border settlement for securities like eurobonds that 
use ICSDs as the central depository. However, even when Asian bonds are deposited in the 
NCSD of the country of issue and not in an ICSD, their settlement can still be executed 
through an ICSD. In this case, the ICSD should be linked to the NCSDs of individual 
countries or to the custodian banks that are members of the NCSDs. Countries that have 
these linkages with ICSDs are called clearing members. Table 1 shows the 31 clearing 
members of Euroclear. The table shows that the coverage of Asian countries by Euroclear is 
quite limited. As of 2002, only seven Asian countries were clearing members of Euroclear. 
Cross-border settlement can also be conducted by using an NCSD that has a bilateral 
linkage with the NCSD of the country of issue. Currently, however, there are only a few 
bilateral linkages between Asian NCSDs. Some of these include the linkages between 
Australia and New Zealand, Hong Kong SAR and New Zealand, Korea and Hong Kong and 
Japan and Hong Kong. Except for the linkage between Australia and New Zealand, trading 
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2.2  The case for a regional clearing and settlement system in Asia 
An informal working group has been organised under the Asian Bond Market Initiative of 
ASEAN+3 to review and propose the clearing and settlement system for Asian bond markets. 
Though this group has been in operation for some time, it has yet to make a concrete 
proposal for the clearing and settlement system, although there have been a few 
suggestions. These include utilising the existing ICSDs, establishing a regional settlement 
system by linking NCSDs and creating a new regional ICSD. In this subsection, we will 
review the pros and cons of using the existing ICSDs. In particular, we will discuss the third 
time zone problem that arises when investors use the existing ICSDs located in the 
European time zone to settle securities trades denominated in Asian currencies. 
2.2.1  Limits of using an international central securities depository (ICSD) 
Asian bonds will be issued in the offshore market or in the domestic market of the regional 
financial centres in Asia and will be denominated in the currencies other than the currency of 
the country of issue (Park and Park, 2003). As a result, Asian bonds are likely to be 
international bonds like eurobonds. Since securities traded in the eurobond markets are 
mostly deposited in and settled through ICSDs such as Euroclear or Clearstream, the same 
ICSDs may also serve as the depository for Asian bonds. Then, Asian bonds denominated in 
Asian currencies can be settled through the existing ICSDs in the same way eurobonds 
denominated in Asian currencies are currently settled through the ICSDs. 
Currently, Euroclear offers investors a choice of the currency of settlement, but as shown in 
Table 2, the range of choices is very limited.
7 Only 32 currencies for 42 countries are 
available for settlement, and of these, only nine are Asian currencies. The currencies of 
Korea, China, India and Taiwan, China (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan) are not included, 
but this is not because they are not internationalised. The Malaysian ringgit and the 
Singapore dollar are settlement currencies in Euroclear even though they are not 
internationalised. 
Most Asian currencies are not Euroclear settlement currencies because there are some 
limitations on their convertibility or substantial legal uncertainties regarding the application of 
regulations on foreign currency transactions. In Korea, for example, omnibus accounts 
(accounts for large groups of investors) are not permitted. This is a major reason that the 
Korean won is excluded from the list.
8 Non-resident investors in Korea are required to report 
their individual identities when opening Korean won-denominated accounts. This regulation 
prohibits ICSDs from opening omnibus accounts with the NCSD in Korea. If an ICSD has an 
omnibus account in its own name and manages all the internal transactions among its 
members, the government fears that it will be unable to monitor individual transactions. This 
regulation, however, subjects foreign investors to onerous procedural requirements and does 
not permit protection of investors’ anonymity. For these reasons, Euroclear does not 
designate the Korean won as a currency of settlement.
9 
                                                  
7  Euroclear (2002) lists settlement currencies and cash correspondents. 
8  Oh et al (2003b) present the reasons why ICSDs do not include the won among settlement currencies. 
9  The Indonesian rupiah is a currency of settlement in Euroclear, but its use became somewhat restricted after 
the financial crisis in 1997. The restriction is not due to exchange rate or credit risk to Euroclear: as the 
settlement of Euroclear is done via the RTGS and DVP systems, Euroclear is not subject to any exchange 
rate or credit risk. The restriction was introduced due to increasing uncertainty with regard to regulation on 
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Table 2 
Settlement currencies of Euroclear 
Region Country   
Asia  Australia (AUD), New Zealand (NZD), Hong Kong (HKD), 
Indonesia (IDR), Japan (JPY), Malaysia (MYR), Philippines 
(PHP), Singapore (SGD), Thailand (THB) 
Nine currencies 
of nine countries 
Europe  EUR (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), 
Norway (NOK), Sweden (SEK), Denmark (DKK), Switzerland 
(CHF), the United Kingdom (GBP), 
[Republic of Croatia (HRK), Czech (CZK), Republic of Iceland 
(ISK), Slovakia (SKK), Estonia (EEK), Hungary (HUF), 
Lithuania (LTL), Latvia (LVL), Poland (PLN)]
1 




USA (USD), Argentina (ARS), Canada (CAD), Mexico (MXN)  Four currencies 
of four countries 
Middle East and 
Africa 




Others Gold  (XAU)
2 One  currency 
Total  32 currencies of 42 countries   
1  Countries in [ ] are not clearing members of Euroclear, but their currencies are designated as currencies of 
settlement. Russia is a clearing member of Euroclear, but the Russian ruble is not a currency of settlement 
(payments are settled in US dollars). Gold is converted into one of the currencies of settlement and then settled 
according to its value in the currency in question. 
Source: Korea Securities Depository. 
 
In addition to the limitation on the currencies of settlement, there is also limitation on the 
countries of settlement. If we exclude Australia and New Zealand, only seven countries in 
Asia are directly or indirectly connected to Euroclear: Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, with some restriction on Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Other Asian countries such as Korea, China, Taiwan, India and Pakistan are not 
clearing members of Euroclear. The low coverage of Euroclear in the Asian region indicates 
that there is potential demand for a regional ICSD, and we will take this issue up in the next 
section. 
The selection criteria for clearing members are not identical to those for currencies of 
settlement. All four cases are possible if we compare Table 1 and Table 2. First, countries 
such as Japan and Thailand are clearing members of Euroclear, and their currencies are 
designated currencies of settlement. Second, Russia is a clearing member of Euroclear, but 
its currency is not a settlement currency. Third, there are countries such as Korea that are 
not clearing members and whose currencies are not designated as currencies of settlement. 
Fourth, countries such as Croatia, the Czech Republic, Israel and Iceland are not clearing 
members, but their currencies are used for settlement. 
2.2.2  The need to create a regional clearing and settlement system 
The low coverage of the Asian countries and currencies by existing ICSDs provides a case 
for creating a regional ICSD for Asian bond markets. Besides the limited coverage, there is 
another reason for creating a regional ICSD; that is, the time zone problem. 208  BIS Papers No 30
 
Since most Asian currencies are not internationalised, the payment settlement of Asian 
bonds denominated in local currencies must be finalised in the local market, even though 
securities settlement can be done through ICSDs located in Europe. However, due to the 
difference in time zone between Europe and Asia, real-time settlement of Asian bonds is not 
possible, and there have been calls to establish a regional clearing and settlement system 
within Asia, the third time zone, in order to cover the non-business hours of the two other 
time zones, Europe and the Americas. 
To illustrate the third time zone problem, consider the settlement process of an Asian bond 
denominated in Hong Kong dollars.
10 Hong Kong is seven hours ahead of Brussels, where 
Euroclear is located. Assume that the settlement date of the bond transaction is 2 October in 
Brussels. In order to finalise the settlement by that date, Euroclear currently mandates that 
the buyer and the seller deposit money and securities in the common depository of Euroclear 
in Hong Kong, HSBC Bank, by 1 October, which is a day before the settlement date. After 
receiving a notification from HSBC overnight, Euroclear Bank in Brussels completes the 
security settlement by 9 am on 2 October (4 pm in Hong Kong). Then, the seller in Hong 
Kong can withdraw Hong Kong dollars and the settlement can be finished by 2 October. 
Instead of depositing money and securities a day before the settlement date, if the buyer and 
seller want to settle securities using the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system on 
2 October in Belgian time, the seller may not be able to withdraw money by 2 October. For 
example, by the time the RTGS settlement is completed by 3 pm on 2 October, it is already 
10 pm in Hong Kong, and the bond seller has to wait until the next day to withdraw his 
money. This is one reason why Euroclear mandates that traders deposit money and 
securities a day in advance of the settlement date for bonds that are denominated in Asian 
currencies. If bonds are denominated in European currencies or the US dollar, securities and 
payment settlement can be completed on the same day through the RTGS system as there 
is no time zone difference, and the time difference between Europe and the Americas works 
favourably between security settlement and payment settlements. The time zone problem 
implies that investors have to bear the extra cost of losing liquidity for a day when trading 
Asian currency denominated bonds. If there were a regional ICSD within Asia, investors 
would not face this extra cost. The benefit of solving the third time zone problem can be 
significant considering that the major investors for Asian currency denominated bonds are 
institutional investors located in Asia. 
The time zone problem may also hinder efforts to reduce the settlement cycle. The recent 
movement to do so has been motivated by a report by the Group of Thirty (1988) that 
recommended that the settlement cycle be reduced to T+3 in order to reduce settlement risk. 
The settlement cycle and settlement amount are the key determinants of settlement risk. 
Accommodating the report’s recommendation, major countries have reduced the settlement 
cycle to T+3. Some, including the United States, plan to reduce the settlement cycle further 
down to T+1. 
If trades of Asian bonds denominated and settled in Asian currencies are settled through a 
regional settlement system, such as a regional ICSD located in Asia and operating in the 
Asian time zone, then investors would not have to deposit securities or money one day in 
advance of the settlement date. This would not only facilitate liquidity management by 
investors but would also make it possible to reduce the settlement cycle down to T+1. 
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2.3  Proposals for establishing a regional clearing and settlement system in Asia 
The previous subsection presented the reasons for creating a regional clearing and 
settlement system for Asian bond markets. There are a couple of proposals to create a 
regional clearing and settlement system: the bilateral linkage model and the regional ICSD 
model. In this subsection, we will review these two proposals. 
2.3.1  Model I: Bilateral linkages between NCSDs for cross-border settlements 
If bilateral linkages can be established among Asian NCSDs, cross-border settlement is 
possible without ICSDs. In fact, the European Central Securities Depositories Association 
(ECSDA) once proposed a bilateral linkage model for cross-border settlement in Europe. 
Figure 1 shows two pan-European bilateral linkage models that ECSDA has studied. One is 
the Eurolinks Real-time Network model (Spaghetti Model), and the other is the European 
Financial Superhighway (Cannelloni Model). The former connects all NCSDs with each 
other, while the latter uses major NCSDs as pivots to connect other small NCSDs. Both 
models emphasise the need to strengthen mutual linkages among NCSDs. 
Figure1 

















































































































Within Asia, Hong Kong has shown the greatest interest in bilateral linkage models. The 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has proposed the establishment of AsiaClear, a 
regional settlement institution, by linking the clearing and settlement systems of member 
countries in Asia in the manner of the internet. That is, the HKMA defines AsiaClear not as a 
single hub institution, but as a common network among individual NCSDs in Asia. Thanks to 
advances in information technology, HKMA believes that linking NCSDs is now feasible in 
virtual space. For this reason, disagreement over where to locate AsiaClear can be 
finessed.
11 In fact, the HKMA has been actively pursuing linkages with other Asian countries; 
it now has links with Australia, New Zealand and Korea, and soon will have one with China.
12 
                                                  
11  HKMA (1997a) researched the state of financial market and IT development in Hong Kong that might enable 
Hong Kong to function as a financial hub in Asia. 
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However, there are a number of problems with applying bilateral linkage models to Asia. 
First, it is an inefficient method compared with settlement through ICSDs. Transaction costs 
in bilateral linkage models would likely be high as each NCSD has to open accounts in the 
NCSDs of all counterparties. Second, these models could only handle securities registered in 
both NCSDs being used for a transaction. Third, the initial setup costs of establishing 
bilateral linkages can be high if countries do not share standardised settlement platforms.
13 
However, the most serious bottleneck in applying bilateral linkage models is that bond 
markets in Asian countries are at such greatly varying stages of development that they 
cannot be readily linked to each other. Among Asian NCSDs, only seven countries (Australia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore) are using RTGS and 
delivery versus payment (DVP) systems. Table 3 shows the wide difference among Asian 
NCSDs with regard to compliance with the recommendations of G30/ISSA, which renders 
the building of bilateral linkages among them difficult.
14 
Different legal systems are another factor. Unlike Europe, where the legal systems of each 
country are relatively similar, Asian countries have much more varied historical backgrounds, 
cultures and legal systems, which make it difficult to standardise linkages among Asian 
NCSDs. 
2.3.2  Model II: Building a regional ICSD - AsiaSettle 
Oh et al (2003b) propose that AsiaSettle, a regional ICSD, be established as a regional 
clearing and settlement system in Asia. According to this proposal, AsiaSettle will serve as 
the hub for the cross-border settlement of Asian bonds with NCSDs serving as the 
subdepositories. Unlike Euroclear, which is for the most part indirectly linked to NCSDs 
through custodian banks, AsiaSettle will be directly linked to NCSDs. The direct linkage 
model has the cost advantage over the indirect linkage model. For the cash settlement, 
AsiaSettle will be directly linked to the central banks of Asian countries rather than to 
custodian banks. The direct linkage to the central banks has the advantage of reducing the 
settlement cycle as well as the settlement cost. Oh et al (2003b) discuss in detail the pros 
and cons of alternative models of operation and governance structure for AsiaSettle. 
The AsiaSettle model belongs to the hub and spoke model as far as settlement for Asian 
bonds is concerned. The advantage of this model lies with the low setup cost since it fully 
utilises the existing settlement infrastructure. The public characteristics of AsiaSettle may 
also serve as a positive factor in building the direct linkages to NCSDs, considering Asian 
governments’ interest in promoting Asian bond markets.
15 AsiaSettle can be established as a 
private agency funded by the NCSDs and the central banks of Asian countries, or as a 
multilateral agency. 
AsiaSettle’s raison d’être has been set forth above in subsection 2.2: the limited coverage of 
settlement services in Asia by existing ICSDs such as Euroclear and the time zone problem. 
There are more reasons to create a regional ICSD for Asian bond markets: harmonisation of 
regulations and introduction of a central counterparty (CCP). 
                                                  
13  Park and Hong (2001) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of bilateral linkage models. 
14  For more details, see ISSA (2002). 
15  Direct linkage means that an ICSD has its own omnibus account in a local NCSD. Indirect linkage means that 
an ICSD is linked to a local NCSD through a third party such as a specialised or common depository. It is 
more common for Euroclear to have indirect linkages with NCSDs. BIS Papers No 30  211
 
Table 3 
NCSDs of Asian countries: 
compliance with G30/ISSA recommendations 
 BA CN HK IN  ID  JP KR MY PA PH SG TH TW
Trade comparisons between 
direct market participants by T+0                           
Matched trade details should be 
linked in the settlement system                         
Indirect market participants to 
achieve affirmation by T+1                
Central depository, broadest 
possible participation                         
Widest possible range of 
depository eligible instruments                       
Immobilisation/ dematerialisation 
to the utmost extent possible                           
Compatible rules and practices 
in case of municipal CSDs                  
Real-time gross settlement 
system                 
Trade netting system as per 
Lamfalussy recommendations                   
Delivery vs payment (DVP) as 
defined by ISSA                     
Same day funds for securities 
settlement                           
Same day funds for the servicing 
of securities portfolios                     
A rolling settlement system 
should be adopted by all 
markets                      
Final settlement for all trades by 
T+3                    
Securities lending and borrowing 
should by encouraged                       
Existing regulatory and taxation 
barriers should be removed                 
ISO Standard 7775  
(Securities  Messages)               
ISO Standard 6166  
(ISIN Numbering System)                         
BA: Bangladesh, CN: China, HK: Hong Kong SAR, IN: India, ID: Indonesia, JP: Japan, KR: Korea, 
MY: Malaysia, PA: Pakistan, PH: Philippines, SG: Singapore, TH: Thailand, TW: Taiwan, China. 
Source: Korea Securities Depository. 
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As previously discussed, the low coverage of ICSDs in Asia is partly due to the existence of 
complex regulations and legal uncertainties involving cross-border trading of securities. 
Setting up AsiaSettle through the cooperation of Asian governments offers a great 
opportunity to open domestic markets and harmonise bond market regulations across Asia. 
The existing ICSDs are private entities, and Asian governments have had no incentive to 
ease regulations to increase business flows for the ICSDs unless it is very much in their 
national interest. However, if a regional ICSD were designed under the consent of Asian 
governments, the governments would face incentives to ease and harmonise regulations 
regarding cross-border trading and settlement of securities in order to promote Asian bond 
markets. Thus, AsiaSettle could be an effective catalyst for easing regulations and opening 
up local markets in Asia, and consequently in developing the Asian bond market. 
Harmonisation of regulations, in turn, would enhance the cost efficiency of AsiaSettle. One of 
the criticisms of AsiaSettle is that it would entail the additional cost of creating a new 
institution. Contrary to the common belief, the cost of building the IT infrastructure for 
AsiaSettle would not be very high. Instead, a large portion of the cost would arise from the 
need to study the legal and regulatory environment for cross-border securities trading and 
settlement in each country. It goes without saying that harmonising the regulations would 
greatly reduce the need for research and consultation on legal and regulatory matters. 
Admittedly, harmonisation of regulations enhances the cost efficiency of the bilateral linkage 
model as well. 
Creating a regional ICSD has the advantage of introducing central counterparty services in 
the clearing and settlement of Asian bonds. A CCP is a special financial institution that 
stands between the seller and buyer in each trade. It replaces the original contractual 
obligations to deliver and pay with equivalent obligations by the CCP.
16 As a result, a CCP 
replaces several counterparty exposures with a single one and reduces settlement risks.
17 A 
CCP can benefit the capital markets by offering standardised processing that translates into 
lower operating costs and anonymity among participants. Moreover, a CCP minimises the 
value and volume of settlements through multilateral netting. For example, the gross amount 
of securities settlement at the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in the United 
States in 2000 was about 722 billion US dollars, but after multilateral netting, the net amount 
of settlement shrank to only 22 billion US dollars. 
Taking advantage of the benefits of a latecomer, the clearing and settlement system for 
Asian bond markets could be designed so that AsiaSettle provides CCP services itself or by 
setting up a subsidiary. By providing CCP services for bond settlement, AsiaSettle could 
enhance the efficiency of Asian bond markets and differentiate itself from existing ICSDs. In 
particular, the multilateral netting function of AsiaSettle could be expected to reduce foreign 
exchange (FX) transaction costs in settling Asian bonds denominated in Asian currencies. 
Since most Asian currencies are not internationalised and their exchange rates vary, it is 
more likely that the payment settlements for Asian bonds will be effected by international 
currencies such as the US dollar. However, if CCP services are provided, the volume of FX 
transactions could be reduced significantly through multilateral netting, and settlement costs 
could be significantly lowered. 
                                                  
16  This is known as “novation”. DTCC (2000) has an overview of the current development of the CCP industry. 
17  The DVP system can also reduce settlement risks, but it cannot effectively cover replacement risk. A CCP can 
cover principal as well as replacement risk. BIS Papers No 30  213
 
Table 4 
Local credit agencies in Asian countries 





Korea KR  Fitch  Hanil Cement, Korea 
Development Bank, Fitch 
 KIS  Moody’s  Moody’s 
 NICE  R&I  Domestic  bank 
 SCI  JCR  SB  Partners 
Japan R&I    Nikkei  56.5% 
 JCR    
 Moody’s  Japan  KK  Moody’s  Moody’s 
 S&P  Japan  S&P  S&P 
  Fitch Japan Branch  Fitch  Fitch 






  Fitch Ratings Hong Kong Limited  Fitch  Fitch subsidiary 
  Dagong Global Credit Rating Co Ltd  Moody’s  Moody’s 
 S&P  office  S&P  S&P 
  China Lianhe Credit Rating Co Ltd     
India  The Credit Rating Information Services of 
India Ltd (CRISIL) 
S&P  9.68% acquired by S&P in 
1997 
  Investment Information & Credit Rating 
Agency Ltd (ICRA) 
Moody’s  Moody’s, Central Bank, 
public financial institutions 
  Credit Analysis and Research Limited (CARE)    IDBI, Canara Bank, UTI 
  Fitch Ratings India Pvt Ltd  Fitch  Fitch subsidiary 
Indonesia PEFINDO  S&P  S&P 
  PT Kasnic Credit Rating Indonesia     
Singapore Moody’s Singapore Pte Ltd  Moody’s  Moody’s 
 S&P  office  S&P  S&P 
  Fitch Ratings Singapore Pte Ltd  Fitch  Fitch 




Join venture between 
JCR-VIS and RAM 
Malaysia  Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad (RAM)  Fitch  Fitch 4.9%, minor shares 
held by other banks 
  Malaysian Rating Corp Berhad  Fitch  Affiliate, but Fitch does not 
seem to hold any shares 
Pakistan  JCR-VIS Credit Rating Co Ltd  IIRA, 
CRISL 
JCR 15%, VIS 67.5%, 
KSE 12.5% ISE 5.0% 
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Table 4 (cont) 
Local credit agencies in Asian countries 





Philippines  Philippine Rating Services Corp (PhilRatings)  S&P   
  Fitch Ratings Manila Representative Office  Fitch  Fitch affiliate 
Taiwan, 
China 
Taiwan Ratings Corp (TRC)  S&P  Domestic banks and 
financial institutions 
  Fitch Ratings Taipei Representative Office  Fitch  Fitch subsidiary 
  Moody’s Chinese Taipei branch  Moody’s  Moody’s 
Thailand  Thai Rating & Information Services Co Ltd 
(TRIS) 
  
  Fitch Ratings (Thailand) Ltd  Fitch  Fitch affiliate 
Sri Lanka  Fitch Ratings Lanka Ltd  Fitch  Fitch affiliate 
 
3.  Building a common credit rating system for the Asian bond 
 market 
3.1  Credit rating agencies in East Asia 
3.1.1  Local credit rating agencies 
As seen in Table 4, most East Asian countries have their own local credit rating agencies, 
which are responsible for rating bonds or examining the credit ratings of bank loans. In 
Korea, for example, there are three credit rating agencies that are allowed to rate all types of 
bonds, and one agency that rates only commercial paper (CP) and asset backed-securities 
(ABSs). In Japan, two local agencies, R&I and JCR, are currently in business and global 
credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch have also established themselves in 
the Japanese market. Both R&I and JCR represent themselves as global credit rating 
agencies and provide ratings for samurai and sovereign bonds. With the exception of Japan, 
the credit rating agencies of East Asian countries are primarily focused on rating domestic 
bonds, and most of them are linked to global credit rating agencies through capital 
investment or operational collaboration. The last two columns of Table 4 indicate the 
collaborative ties between local and global rating agencies and their major shareholders. 
3.1.2  Global credit rating agencies in Asia 
In response to the rapid expansion of the financial markets in Asia, global credit rating 
agencies such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch have branched out into Asia. Table 5 shows the 
number of employees at the global credit rating agencies in Asia as of 2001. S&P has 
234 employees, Moody’s 99 and Fitch 66. BIS Papers No 30  215
 
Table 5 
Number of employees at global 
credit rating agencies in Asia, 2001 
 S&P  Moody’s  Fitch 
Japan 80  70  33 
Hong Kong SAR  30  13  17 
Singapore 24  10  4 
Australia 100  6  12 
Total 234  99  66 
Source: Korea Investors Service. 
 
Table 6 shows the number of issuers that have been directly rated by global credit rating 
agencies in Asia. In 2001, Moody’s rated the highest number of issuing companies, followed 
by S&P. However, ratings have been highly concentrated only in those countries where the 
bond markets are relatively more developed, such as Japan, Australia, Korea and Hong 
Kong. 
Table 6 
Number of issuers rated in 2001 
 S&P  Moody’s  Fitch  Total 
Japan 297  504  71  872 
Hong Kong SAR  227  226  178  631 
Singapore 53 89  6  148 
Australia 47  38  3  88 
Total  624 857 258  1,739 
Source: Korea Investors Service. 
 
3.1.3  Association of Credit Rating Agencies in Asia (ACRAA) 
The Association of Credit Rating Agencies in Asia (ACRAA) is an organisation whose 
members currently consist of 20 rating agencies in 11 Asian countries for mutual cooperation 
and joint research. Currently, Japan’s JCR chairs the ACRAA, and PhilRatings of the 
Philippines is the executive director. Every credit rating agency in Asia is eligible for ACRAA 
membership. To join, an agency must receive the Executive Committee’s recommendation 
and then the Board of Directors’ approval. The ACRAA holds a meeting every year at which 
member credit rating agencies discuss various issues concerning mutual collaboration. The 




As of February 2006 
Country  Credit rating agency  Notes 
Bangladesh  Credit Rating Information & Services 
Credit Rating Agency of Bangladesh (CRAB)   
China  Dagong Global Credit Rating 
Shanghai Far East Credit Rating 
 
India  Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited 
(CRISIL) 
Investment Information & Credit Rating Agency (ICRA)
 
Credit Analysis and Research 
Board of directors 
Board of directors 
(Vice Chairman) 
 
Indonesia  PEFINDO Credit Rating Indonesia 
PT Kasnic Credit Rating Indonesia 
 
Japan  Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR)  Board of directors 
(Chairman) 
Korea  Seoul Credit Rating & Information 
Korea Investors Service 
Korea Ratings 
 
Malaysia Rating  Agency Malaysia Berhad 
Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhard (MARC) 
Board of directors 
Pakistan  JCR-VIS Credit Rating 
The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency (PACRA) 
 
Philippines  Philippine Rating Services Corporation (PhilRatings)  Board of directors 
Taiwan Taiwan  Ratings   
Thailand TRIS  Rating   
Source: ACRAA. 
 
3.2  The need for a regional credit rating agency 
As the number of international bond investors increases in Asia, the need for common 
regional credit rating standards becomes greater. The simplest means to meet this need 
would be to utilise the global credit rating agencies, rather than establish a new regional 
institution. Considering the fact that cross-border bond investment in Asia is still quite small, 
utilising global agencies would be more cost effective. However, there are some limitations to 
using the global credit rating agencies if Asian countries want to promote cross-border bond 
investment in local currency denominated bonds. 
The number of local currency denominated bonds in Asia being rated by global credit rating 
agencies is very limited. This number may increase in the future as the Asian bond market 
becomes larger, but the rating standards of global agencies, which are designed mainly for 
developed countries, may not be adequate to differentiate the credit ratings of the Asian 
bonds that are highly concentrated in low credit ratings. 
Table 8 shows the current sovereign credit ratings for foreign currency debt assigned by a 
global credit rating agency. Major developed countries in North America and Europe have BIS Papers No 30  217
 
ratings of AAA, other European countries and Japan have AA ratings, and emerging 
economies have ratings varying from A to B. Because there is little possibility of corporate 
bonds being rated above the sovereign, most Asian bonds will likely be rated lower than 
BBB. Therefore, unless the global rating system’s lower credit ratings are broken down into 
more specific levels, the ratings of Asian bonds will have a very concentrated distribution, 
providing limited if any differentiation. 
Table 8  
Sovereign foreign currency credit ratings 
of Standard & Poor’s, June 2004 
Credit rating  Country 
AAA  Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Isle of 
Man, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
AA+  Belgium, New Zealand, Spain 
AA  Bermuda, Italy, Portugal 
AA–  Andorra, Japan, Slovenia, Taiwan 
A+  Hellenic Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Kuwait, Qatar, 
A  Botswana, Chile, Cyprus, Malta, Saudi Arabia 
A–  The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Korea, 
Lithuania, Malaysia 
BBB+  China, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Trinidad & Tobago 
BBB  Oman, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia 
BBB–  Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Mexico 
BB+  Egypt, El Salvador, Russia 
BB  Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Jordan, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania 
BB–  Grenada, Guatemala, Vietnam 
B+  Belize, Benin, Brazil, Cook Islands, Ghana, Senegal, Turkey 
B  Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mali, Mongolia, Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, Ukraine 
B–  Bolivia, Lebanon, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
CC Dominican  Republic 
CCC+ Ecuador 
D Argentina,  Paraguay 
Source: S&P homepage, www.standardandpoors.com. 
 
In order to solve this concentration problem, the global agencies could adopt a regional 
rating system separate from the global rating system. However, it is doubtful whether they 
will develop such a new system for a market that is relatively small. It might create the 
unwanted impression that the agencies are adopting a double standard. In addition, the 
credibility and accuracy of credit ratings depend on a detailed awareness of local knowledge 
along with scientific methodology. If global rating agencies plan to expand into rating local 218  BIS Papers No 30
 
bonds, they must establish a database and build up local human resources, which would 
entail significant infrastructure building costs. Because of these limitations, direct involvement 
of the global agencies in the local rating business has not been extended beyond the 
collaboration stage with local agents except in Japan. 
Another problem with utilising the global rating agencies is that they are often criticised for 
their lack of impartiality. In 2003, S&P lowered the ratings of major German companies. 
Germany protested the decision and thereafter started to discuss the possibility of 
establishing its own domestic credit rating agency.
18 Ferri and Liu (1999) also argue that 
companies in developing countries are more conservatively rated than companies in 
developed countries. Together with the criticism that the global credit rating agencies lack 
awareness of each country’s specific economic situation, this argument is reinforced by the 
fact that there are many black boxes in their credit rating methodology. 
An alternative to utilising global rating agencies in adopting a common credit rating system is 
for local agencies to jointly establish a regional credit rating agency. If the New Basel Accord, 
which mandates that the credit risk adjusted capital adequacy is to be adopted in the future, 
and the financial supervisory institutions of each country were to encourage domestic 
financial institutions to use the credit ratings of this new institution, the regional agency would 
have a good business outlook, as well. 
However, there are serious drawbacks in establishing a new regional credit rating agency 
through the sponsorship of each country’s government. As is the case with the global rating 
agencies, the regional rating agency must build up the infrastructure, including a database 
and human resources, if it is to rate local bonds in each country, and the costs of building this 
infrastructure would not be negligible. In addition, the agency must build a reputation for 
impartiality and accuracy to compete with global agencies. But it is doubtful whether a 
government-supported agency, which would not be exposed to competition, would be 
acknowledged by the market as impartial and efficiently run. Also, if a regional agency were 
established through government support, it would definitely crowd out the private business of 
local credit rating agencies. 
As seen in Section 2, the establishment of a regional clearing and settlement system with 
government support is justifiable in that it addresses problems associated with market failure; 
it would increase efficiency by concentrating transaction volumes and alleviate the third time 
zone problem. However, establishing a regional credit rating agency is a different problem, 
even if the need for a new common credit rating system in Asia, which can effectively 
differentiate Asian bonds concentrated in low credit ratings, is accepted. Considering the 
drawback of establishing a new regional agency, it would be better for the governments to 
promote cooperation among local and global rating agencies in establishing a common rating 
system and meeting the new business needs. The ACRAA has already started standardising 
the rating systems in anticipation of the development of the Asian bond market. 
3.3  Standardisation for introducing a regional credit rating system 
The bond markets of Asian countries differ in size and degree of development, as do their 
credit rating systems and agencies. Clearly, adopting common credit rating standards 
                                                  
18  In February 2003, when S&P lowered the rating of three major companies in Germany (Thyssen Krupp, Linde 
and Deutsche Post), Europe questioned the fairness of the decision. In August 2003, even though the capital 
of Munich Re, an international reinsurance company based in Germany, had been raised, its credit ratings 
were lowered from AA– to A+. Germany questioned the credit rating capabilities of the global credit rating 
agencies, which led to discussion about establishing a new credit rating agency. Gerke and Pellens (2003) 
argue that the global agencies failed to reflect the difference in pension reserve methods in Germany. BIS Papers No 30  219
 
through mutual cooperation among these agencies will not be an easy task. Despite the 
difficulties, the ACRAA recently announced a plan for mutual cooperation. There is an 
ongoing effort to improve the expertise of analysts of member agencies through mutual 
education programs as well as exchanges on rating standards. Furthermore, a best practices 
committee was set up to determine the common standards for credit ratings, and members 
are actively working on standardising credit rating concepts and sharing credit rating 
methodologies. 
The process of standardising the credit rating systems in Asia that the ACRAA is promoting 
will occur in several stages. The most basic stage involves sharing basic rating concepts and 
offering mutual training through which the member agencies share rating definitions, default 
concepts and other basic credit rating concepts. 
In a more advanced stage of standardisation, agencies could share rating methodologies 
and a joint committee for a common rating system could be considered. At that stage, if 
needed, a regional credit rating agency could be established to rate offshore bonds issued in 
Asia. Instead of governments taking the initiative and financing it, such an agency would 
draw on the voluntary participation of local credit rating agencies from each country. This 
would prevent disagreements between the regional and local agencies because the roles of 
each could be determined beforehand. Moreover, a great deal of overlap in infrastructure 
investment could be avoided by building an information hub that contained each country’s 
database. 
It is expected that actually establishing a common credit rating system for Asia or a regional 
credit agency will require a considerable amount of time. It is imperative in the meantime that 
the local credit rating agencies cooperate with each other in order to develop the Asian bond 
market. For example, if Indonesian bonds were to be pooled together and issued as Korean 
won-denominated CDOs in Korea, a structure should be set up such that the Korean and 
Indonesian credit rating agencies could trust the quality of the each other’s ratings, even if 
there is no regional credit rating system. In other words, there must be a certain degree of 
standardisation between the two countries’ credit ratings. The current effort of the Asian 
governments to develop the Asian bond markets is a valuable opportunity to promote joint 
cooperation among the local credit rating agencies. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper discussed the issues involved in a building infrastructure for Asian bond markets, 
namely establishing a regional security settlement system and credit rating agencies. As for 
a clearing and settlement institution for the Asian bond market, we propose establishing a 
regional ICSD dubbed AsiaSettle by linking the central banks and NCSDs of each country. At 
the initial stage, AsiaSettle would perform as the clearing and settlement system for local 
currency-denominated government bonds of Asian countries. The focus in the early stages 
on government bonds is extremely important; because the supply of high-quality bonds in the 
private sector is low, high-quality government bonds would be an indispensable catalyst for 
the development of the Asian bond market. We also discussed the necessity that AsiaSettle 
also function as the central counterparty for the exchange of government bonds and possess 
Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) platform capabilities. Furthermore, we discussed 
the desirable governance structure of AsiaSettle and proposed that AsiaSettle be established 
as an institution owned by each country’s NCSD and central bank, or as a new multilateral 
agency for Asia. 
As for a regional credit rating system, there is a great need for a common credit rating 
system amongst the Asian countries to develop the Asian bond market. However, unlike the 
clearing and settlement system, it is not recommended that the regional credit rating agency 
be established through government support. This recommendation recognises the high costs 220  BIS Papers No 30
 
of building a centralised agency equipped with an extensive database and specialised local 
human resources to handle the credit rating of local bonds. Moreover, it is questionable 
whether an agency established through government support could compete with private 
agencies in acquiring and retaining a reputation for impartiality. Therefore, this paper opts for 
harmonisation, in which local credit rating agencies and global credit rating agencies 
coordinate in building a common credit rating system. The ACRAA, an organisation of Asia’s 
credit rating agencies, is currently undertaking such a harmonisation process. 
Whether a credit rating or a settlement agency, the argument for building a regional 
institution is mistakenly seen as one of market protection. However, building regional 
infrastructure must be seen not as an attempt at protectionism, but rather as a catalyst for 
opening the underdeveloped Asian bond markets and removing local restrictions on 
developing an international bond market in Asia. 
There is no denying that the best way to begin developing the Asian bond market is to 
develop each country’s domestic bond market and open it up to foreign investors. In other 
words, the optimal method of developing cross-border trading in Asia is for Asian countries to 
open up their domestic bond markets to enable Asian issuers to issue bonds in any country 
of their choice and to enable investors to invest in bonds in the domestic market of any 
country. However, the bond markets of East Asian countries are at greatly varying stages of 
development. Some are much more liberalised than others, and different kinds of capital 
controls are imposed. Some Asian countries do not even have the economies of scale to 
support all the components of the bond market infrastructure, such as a settlement and 
depository system, a primary dealer system, credit rating agencies, bond pricing agencies 
and credit guarantee agencies, which are needed to develop domestic bond markets. It is, 
therefore, very unrealistic to expect every Asian country to develop and open up its domestic 
bond markets in the near future, unless there is political pressure to develop the Asian bond 
market. 
The failure to develop the Asian bond market in the 1990s is a good example. To many, the 
recent discussion on Asian bond markets seems to be a repetition of the old bond market 
idea from the early 1990s. The launching of the dragon bond initiatives in the early 1990s 
sparked discussion in Asia on the development of the Asian bond market which continued 
through the end of the decade. 
In retrospect, however, the Asian bond market initiatives of the 1990s were merely talk 
without action. Their proponents failed to establish a consensus on their benefits. There was 
skepticism about the growth potential of the Asian bond market due to the reluctance of 
Asian countries to liberalise and open up their domestic capital markets for fear of creating 
market distortions and making themselves vulnerable to speculative attacks. The skeptics 
also did not believe that the Asian bond market would attract much attention because there 
were already well established, efficient international bond markets such as the eurobond 
market. 
The situation changed greatly during the Asian financial crisis, and we are finally seeing 
some meaningful action towards establishing Asian bond markets at least on the government 
level. A consensus among Asian economies has emerged that regional bond markets should 
be promoted in order to facilitate the recycling of regional savings and to prevent the 
recurrence of financial crises as explained in the introduction. For these reasons, Asian 
countries finally agree on the importance of developing the Asian bond market, and this is a 
great opportunity for each country to ease government regulations and open domestic 
markets to international investors. The attempt to build regional infrastructure for the Asian 
bond markets should not be interpreted as an effort to close off and protect the Asian market, 
but rather as an opportunity to open and develop it through harmonisation of regulations, 
policy coordination and improvements in legal structures. BIS Papers No 30  221
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